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Equity Market Timing, How Long Does It Last? 
 
Abstract 
 Market timing is a very well-known investment strategy, albeit a difficult one to execute 
properly. Equity market timing is a type of market timing investment plan whereby a company 
issues equity when their market price is high and repurchases equity when the price is low. The 
cost of equity for a firm can be lowered by taking advantage of such fluctuations. This analysis 
documents the importance of market equity timing as a facet of real financial policy, with very 
persistent effects when observing present capital structures. Results indicate that subsequent 
capital structures are derived from the incremental outcome of managers’ historical attempts to 
time the equity market. 
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Timing do Mercado de Capital Próprio, Quanto Tempo Dura? 
 
Abstrato 
Timing do mercado é uma estratégia de investimento muito conhecida no mundo 
financeiro, mas de difícil execução. Timing do mercado de capital próprio é um plano de 
investimentos em que a empresa emite ações quando o seu preço de mercado é alto e recompra 
ações quando o seu preço é baixo, quando comparado com antigos valores de mercado e 
contabilísticos. Aproveitando essa flutuação, a empresa consegue reduzir o custo do capital em 
comparação com outras formas de financiamento externo. Esta análise documenta que a 
estratégia de timing é um especto importante e real na política financeira das diferentes 
empresas, com efeitos muito persistentes na estrutura de capital das mesmas. Os resultados 
indicam que a atual estrutura de capital é o resultado incremental de passadas tentativas feitas 
pelos gerentes em ordem de avaliar o mercado de capitais. 
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 Market timing is a very recognized investment strategy, although opinions within the 
literature diverge on the ease of its execution, most authors advocate that it is a relatively 
difficult type of trading which can only be properly accomplished by managers and individuals 
with high levels of financial knowledge and skills. Equity market timing is a type of investment 
plan where the company issues equity when their market price is high and repurchases equity 
when the price is low. By taking advantage of such fluctuations, a firm can lower the cost of 
equity compared to the costs of other capital sources and thus benefit from them. 
 In a completely efficient marketplace, as first mentioned by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), different capital forms possess the same costs, thus there is no benefit from 
opportunistically switching between types of financing. Such conditions do not arise in the real 
world, and there are certain costs which must be necessarily taken into account when choosing 
means of external financing. Within an inefficient capital market, shareholders will profit from 
market timing. Therefore, if managers think they can time the market, undertaking such an 
approach will likely come across as a signal that they care about investors. 
 Several previous works of research on the subject have suggested that market equity 
timing is an important aspect within real financial policy.1 On preliminary evidence, it appears 
clear that when the market value of a company is high when compared to previous market and 
book values, the firm will tend to issue equity rather than debt, and when the market valuation 
is low the firm will tend to repurchase shares.2 The following evidence provided insight into 
capital structures and subsequent long-term stock returns, suggesting that market equity timing 
is normally effective, rendering equity issues appealing when the cost of equity is low, and vice 
versa3. The authors of a third separate analysis further observed that companies have a tendency 
to issue equity when stakeholders are excited about forecast results and earnings.4 A fourth set 
of authors, Harvey and Graham (2001) performed an anonymous survey of various CFOs, who 
acknowledged attempts to time the market. 2/3 of chief financial officers within this survey 
further disclosed that both overvalued and undervalued stock prices influence the issuing of 
 
1 See Alti (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and others. 
2 Concurring with the works of Marsh (1982), Taggart (1977), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, 
Opler and Titman (2001), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1995), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), and others. 
3 See Ritter (1991, 1995), Jegadeesh (2000), Stigler (1964), Ikenberry (1995), Fama (1998), Norli et al. 
(2000), Baker and Wargler (2000), and others. 
4 See Teoh et al. (1998), Ritter and Loughran (1997), Rajan (1997), Sarin et.al (2001), and others. 
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stock, and recent stock price increases made them even likelier to attempt to sell the stock at an 
even higher price. Stock prices were voted the second most important aspect when making the 
decision on whether or not to issue equity. 
 The main research goal of our study is to identify the means through which equity 
market timing influences a company’s capital structure, and whether such an influence has 
short- or long-term effects. Given the extensive research within the literature, the existence of 
a short-term impact should be evident. Nonetheless, the existence of a long-term impact is more 
questionable since companies can balance and dilute the effects of equity market timing. 
Classical financial literature suggests as much, meaning that there is little if any consensus on 
this approaches’ theoretical long-term effects.  
 The results we obtained concur with the theory that shows that the effects of market 
timing are not only persistent, they also have a significant impact on a firm’s capital structure. 
Firms with low leverage increase funds when the market value is high (measured by the ratio 
market-to-book), while firms with high leverage tend to increase their funds when the market 
value is low. 
 The results of our analysis were obtained through statistical regressions, the majority of 
these consisting of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), while some applied the Fama-Macbeth 
method. Leverage ratio and variations of the same variable always take the position of 
dependent variable, while independent variables change throughout our analysis. One of the 
most relied upon ratios was the external financing weighted average market-to-book ratio, or 
𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 ratio for short. This independent variable is a weighted average of previous market-
to-book ratios which takes external financing, debt or equity into consideration. The ratio 
returns high values for firms that have already raised external financing in the past, when the 
market-to-book ratio was high, while returning a low value if a company raised external 
financing when the market-to-book value was low. The application of this ratio enables us to 
conclusively propose that leverage and historical data were strongly and negatively correlated. 
These results are robust and economically significant regardless of whether the relationship is 
tested against the book or market valuation. 
 It became clear further into our work that previous valuations have a persistent impact 
on capital structures. In order to measure this persistence, we implemented three different types 
of tests. The first one uses leverage as a dependent variable, while controlling for the actual 
market-to-book ratio, leaving the external financed weighted average ratio to capture solely the 
firm’s in-house fluctuation. The discovered variation helped to explain the capital structure 
outcomes, suggesting that these momentary fluctuations in the market values lead to perpetual 
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modifications in the company’s capital structure. The second test utilizes the original levels of 
capital structure and proceeds to assess how successive oscillations in market values affect a 
firm’s capital structure. A third test is also applied whereupon we checked the power of the 
weighted average ratio lagged values, discovering that the impact of this variable on the capital 
structure lasted for more than 10 years. These results suggest that the capital structure of 2018 
depends strongly on the market-to-book oscillations that existed in 2008 and earlier. This 
variation presented within the market-to-book ratio has long term influences on capital 
arrangement, rendering our results difficult to explain by relying solely on traditional capital 
theories. 
 The market-to-book ratio is a measure of investment opportunities and risk of capital 
structures. Trade-off theory forecasts that fluctuations in this indicator should be momentary if 
one is to achieve an optimal capital arrangement. This suggestion was not verified by our 
results, with these temporary effects being instead shown to be very persistent. On the pecking 
order theory, Myers reports that managers try to prevent issuing equity, and on a dynamic 
version they reduce leverage to increase the probability of investment. Our results did not 
concur with this theory either, with the robust relationship we found between long-term 
investment prospects and leverage being particularly difficult to explain under this theoretical 
framework. The entrenchment theory proposed by Zwiebel (1996) however, is mainly 
concurrent with our statistical results. Periods in which a company has high market values can 
lead to the entrenchment of management, resulting in a reduction of the relevance of an optimal 
point for the capital structure as external debt financing options will tend to be resisted. 
 The simplest and most direct way to explain the results of our paper, is that a firm’s 
capital structure is the incremental outcome of all managers’ historical attempts to time the 
equity market. The two versions of market equity timing could also clarify these outcomes. The 
first version of these, expanded upon by Myers and Majluf (1984) integrated rational agents 
and adverse costs, which are inversely connected to the market-to-book ratio. In the second 
version of market equity timing, company managers look at investors as irrational agents, and 
thus assume that the increase of equity usually happens in an abnormal way when its cost is 
low. Both versions require adverse selection costs to reduce desirability on market timing. 
Although both are consistent with our results, the second one appears more appropriate for our 
purposes, given earnings and long-run evidence. 
 Everything discussed in this section will be expanded upon and presented in more detail 
throughout our work in the following sections. The thesis is divided into a literature review 
section, a methodology section which includes data and summary statistics and regressions 
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(section 3), a results section (section 4), a discussion & limitations section (section 5), followed 
by a section containing our conclusions (section 6). Robustness checks (section 7) and an 
































2. Literature review 
 
 Looking at the current market context, a significant number of different debt and equity 
instruments can be found. A firm’s capital structure can possess a variety of compositions 
depending on the different instruments that companies choose to rely upon for self-financing. 
Some companies may decide to finance themselves only through debt or equity, while others 
may find that the perfect spot is somewhere in between, choosing instead to mix both 
approaches. Even the earliest analyses of capital structures have seen authors trying to find the 
perfect capital structure to maximize a firm’s market value. A straight answer has continue to 
elude researchers, resulting in the continuation of this topic as one of the most widely discussed 
within the finance literature. 
 On this section, we will address some important topics and findings within the wider 
existing body of literature that will serve as a basis for our study and its theoretical framework. 
 
2.1 Trade-off Theory 
 
 The first formal proposal for the trade-off theory was published by Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973). This theory was derived from what is arguably one of the most important 
papers in finance literature, Modigliani and Miller’s 1963 work. In this seminal piece, 
Modigliani and Miller stated that debt can maximize a firm’s value (i.e., by contracting more 
debt the company can take advantage of the deductible tax). They further proposed that 
although debt is a cheaper way of financing the company when compared to equity, one should 
refrain from analyzing debt solely from this perspective since adding debt also increases the 
probability of financial distress (Ang,  Chua and McConnel (1982) and Jensen and Smith 
(1984)).  
 It is important to note that different companies will possess different debt percentages, 
and that managers will always attempt to pursue optimum ratios (Marsh (1982)). In order to 
reach the ideal point of debt, one should look at the marginal value of tax on increasing debt in 
a manner that minimizes capital costs while maximizing a company’s value. This evidence 
suggests that healthier companies should take advantage of debt, but many authors over the 
years have digressed and offered counter propositions, suggesting instead that: higher non-debt 
tax shields indicate less debt (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)); too much debt can lead to asset 
substitution and conflicts of interest between bond- and share-holders (Fama and Miller (1972) 
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and Jensen and Meckling (1976)); there is no evidence that tax shields increase the value of a 
company (Fama and French (1998)). 
 The book-to-market ratio is an important indicator in this dissertation study and can be 
connected to different aspects of our main relied-upon theory, particularly when assessing the 
costs of financial distress. Firms with growth and investment opportunities are those that lose 
more with debt, since a significant debt burden can prevent new capital from being raised 
(Myers (1976); Smith and Watts (1992); Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995)). However, trade-off theory literature establishes a main relation between 
market-to-book and capital structure saying that capital structures will slowly respond to the 
market-to-book ratio. 
 
2.2 Pecking Order Theory 
 
 This theory first saw the light of day in Donaldson’s 1961 paper, before being further 
developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), with the notion of optimal structure disappearing, along 
with the suggestion that capital structures should be seen as an asymmetric conflict between 
inside and outside financing. This asymmetry can vary in its impact and effect on the moment 
of choice for not only inside and outside financing, but also between debt and equity. 
 CEO's will typically prefer to rely upon internal rather than external financing options, 
not merely because they possess more information within the firm than outside firm financiers, 
but also because external financing will invariably mean that managers lose their information 
advantage. This model thus proposes that managers will tend to prioritize the choosing of 
internal funds, followed by debt, and only then followed by equity. Furthermore, in situations 
where a firm has a lack of investment opportunities, managers tend to retain earnings in order 
to build a financial stack in order to prevent outside financing in the near future, with equity 
issues only taking place when the risk of bankruptcy is too big (when debt costs are large). 
When a company decides to issue shares, investors start to ponder whether this is taking place 
because the manager believes them to be currently overvalued in the market. If the firm issues 
debt however, investors are likely to think that the company is undervalued.  
A well performing company following the precepts laid out by this theory should have 
a lower debt ratio, given that these ratios should only increase when the firms need outside 
financing. There are significant difficulties to the analysis of the relationship between book-to-
market and capital structure values through the 1st theory proposed, also denominated as static 
theory. Myers further proposes an alternative dynamic version, whereby high growth firms 
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decrease leverage to avoid equity investments in the future (Myers (1984) and Fama and French 
(2000)). 
 
2.3 Managerial Entrenchment Theory 
 
 Managerial entrenchment takes place when a manager invests in order to increase his 
value as an employee, rather than to benefit the company’s finances. This is essentially the topic 
under discussion on Zwibel’s (1996) paper, “Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial 
Entrenchment”. The underlying idea in this case is that equity financing is facilitated through 
high valuations and good investments, but it also allows managers to become rooted. This 
theory in itself has some intrinsic connection to market timing, since managers issue equity 
when the market value of the company is high.  
 
2.4 Market Timing Theory 
 
 The theory of Market Timing will provide the theoretical foundation for this paper’s 
results. This principle has been widely discussed within the literature, resulting in the creation 
of three very important versions of equity market timing. The last one by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) states that the actual capital structure is given by the cumulative past outcomes of 
managers trying to time the equity market. We expect this version to provide the most 
appropriate and accurate explanations for the results of our study. 
 The genesis of the first dynamic version can be found in Myers and Majluf’s 1984 paper, 
incorporating rational agents, namely managers and investors, while also taking the variation 
of adverse selection costs into account, not only between firms, but across different timeframes 
as well. This theory experienced a significant number of changes since its inception (Lucas and 
McDonald (1990); Korajczykm Lucas and McDonald (1992) and Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993)) and even some authors have found that equity issues tend to be announced following 
the release of information which could potentially reduce information asymmetry (Korajczyk, 
Lucas and McDonald (1991)), or that equity issues clusters around times of smaller 
announcement effects (Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996)).  
 The second dynamic version follows an altogether different train of thought, affording 
greater consideration to irrational agents and time-varying mispricing. This version of the 
theory suggests instead that managers issue equity when costs are low and repurchase when 
expenses are high. One important aspect of this second dynamic is that the market does not 
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need to be efficient, it does not assume that managers successfully predict stock returns, it 
simply suggests that they believe they can truly time the market. 
 The market-to-book ratio has different interpretations regarding these different 
dynamics. Within the paper made by Myers and Majluf, this ratio measures variations in 
adverse selection. Furthermore, the second dynamic version suggests that book-to-market 
extreme values are connected to extreme investor expectations, while being historically 
inversely related to future equity returns  (La Porta (1996); La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997); Frankel and Lee (1998) and Shleifer (2000)). The paper published in 2002 saw 
them applying this same ratio for the purposes of measuring the market timing opportunities 



























 The existing literature drawn upon throughout this paper largely suggests that individual 
financing will tend to depend on the market-to-book ratio. Our goal within this thesis is to 
document the cumulative effect of the market-to-book ratio in the current capital structure of a 
company while also, as suggested by the market timing strategy, assessing whether this ratio 
has persistent effects which are reflected on the capital structure through net equity issues. 
 
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
 The main sample for this model was extracted from COMPUSTAT, with firms present 
between 1987 and 2018 within this database being selected for our study. Only companies for 
which the IPO date could be defined as taking place between those 30 years became part of our 
final sample. 5 Knowing the IPO date enabled us to control the leverage behavior and assessing 
how it changed over a given timeframe, while also checking the relationship between leverage 
and the market-to-book indicator. 
 In order to create the sample, we relied upon 3 different databases: COMPUSTAT, Jay 
Ritter, and Screener. IPO dates were not directly extracted from COMPUSTAT given the 
database’s inconsistency in this variable.6 This shortcoming led us to rely on the Jay Ritter and 
Screener (provided by Thomson Reuters) databases for identifying the specific IPO dates, 
mirroring the data sources used by Wurgler, Baker (2002), and Ritter (2003) in their previous, 
rigorous studies. It should be noted that these databases will only identify the subset of 
COMPUSTAT firms that will be used in the analysis. 
 The IPO year is reported as the first-year market value data available on COMPUSTAT. 
Our sample was further restricted to eliminate companies with a SIC code between 6000 and 
6999, also identified as financial companies. This specific set of firms was excluded due to their 
inherent and abnormal leverage ratio values. While these are by no means unusual for financial 
companies, such high levels will typically serve as significant indicators of financial distress in 
the majority of other company types (Fama and French (1992)). Other types of companies 
which we excluded from our sample include: Firms with a value of book assets less than $10 
million for the purposes of removing relatively small companies, firms with missing values on 
 
5 In order to calculate the Pre-IPO years, a compensation of 1 year is given.  
6 Only 60% of the final data IPO dates were presented in the COMPUSTAT database alone. 
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the variable assets between the year they went public and the year they exited COMPUSTAT, 
and firms with a single year of available data. 
 In order to create all the variables required for our report, some variables which were 
already presented through the COMPUSTAT database needed to be combined into new ones. 
These will be expanded upon below.  
 Book equity is thus the result of total assets and convertible debt minus total liabilities, 
preferred stock, or redemption value of the same when the first one is missing, along with 
deferred taxes. Book debt is simply the difference between total assets and book equity. Both 
variables will be used for the purposes of calculating book and market leverage. The first one 
is calculated by dividing book debt by total assets, while the second one is calculated by 
dividing book debt by total assets, before adding market equity minus book equity. Market 
equity is a relatively straightforward calculation, taken from the multiplication of outstanding 
common shares outstanding by price (Fama and French (2000)). Net equity issues (e/At) 
represents the change in book equity, minus the change in retained earnings, all then being 
divided by total assets. Newly retained earnings (∆RE/At) represents the change in retained 
earnings, divided by assets. Finally, net debt issues (d/At) is simply the residual change in assets 
divided by total assets. 7 After calculating and creating all of these variables, the sample was 
restricted even further by excluding firm-year observations with a book leverage above 1 or 
below 0. 
 This analysis is reported in IPO years, relying upon different subsamples holding the 
number of fiscal years of a company following an IPO date. As such, k in the term IPO+k 
indicates the number of years that a company survived following an initial offering. The sample 
includes 3,678 companies at the end of the first fiscal year, with this number being reduced to 
3,523 by the end of the next year, eventually being reduced down to 1,539 when looking at 10 
fiscal years after the IPO. It is also worth mentioning that the number of Pre-IPO observations 
is a significantly smaller number when compared to the IPO year. This is due to the 
COMPUSTAT database failing to provide certain company-specific information prior to their 
public offering.  
 Our following table will present the summary statistics concerning the financial 
decisions taken within our sample. A thorough analysis of the table allows us to draw some 
conclusions on these decisions. Table 1 demonstrates that a firm’s book leverage experiences a 
considerable decrease when undergoing an IPO, and while the value of this ratio increases in 
 





Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
This table contains the means and standard deviation values. Book leverage was done dividing book debt by assets and is restricted between 0 and 
1. Market leverage is book debt divided by total assets minus book equity plus market equity. New debt issues was calculated by dividing residual 
change in assets to assets. Net equity issues is book equity minus change in retained earnings all divided by assets. Newly retained earnings is 
defined as change in retained earnings split by assets. All the variables are expressed in percentage terms. The time is expressed in IPO years. 
 
 
Book Leverage 𝑫/𝑨𝒕 (%) Market Leverage 𝑫/𝑨𝒕 (%) 𝒅/𝑨𝒕(%) 𝒆/𝑨𝒕 (%) ∆𝑹𝑬/𝑨𝒕 (%) 
Year N Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Pre-IPO 1979 60.32 25.24 - - - - - - - - 
IPO 3678 40.86 23.85 25.25 21.77 0.45 24.09 34.19 34.33 1.70 21.51 
IPO+1 3523 42.15 23.37 29.37 23.28 7.19 15.66 9.67 19.55 -3.16 22.67 
IPO+3 2833 43.97 23.00 33.79 25.09 4.43 15.86 6.82 22.85 -3.66 26.53 
IPO+5 2279 44.42 22.85 35.37 25.60 0.06 58.65 5.98 20.10 -4.06 29.72 
IPO+10 1539 45.93 21.95 34.98 23.66 0.48 43.04 2.41 23.03 -0.67 27.24 
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the next 10 years, the market ratio values increased even further. The last 3 financial decision 
indicators also suggest that a major increase switch occurs in debt financing during a company’s 
transition into its 2nd IPO year. Taking into consideration that the change in assets is composed 
by the sum of net equity with debt issues, plus retained earnings, the composition change of a 
company in the 2nd year is determined by roughly 35% and 50% in debt and equity issuing 













































3.2.1 Annual changes in leverage 
 
 This section will endeavor to begin a preliminary analysis on both leverage and the 
market-to-book ratio, before proceeding to provide deeper insights into market equity timing 
which will be applied throughout our work. Our analysis will begin by assessing leverage 
changes within a firm and their relationship to market-to-book net effects to distill their specific 
impact, therefore allowing us to test some of the hypotheses already put forward within the 
existing literature. 
 High market-to-book values tend to emerge from firms which present high growth rates, 
but which may also be issuing as much debt as equity. For our research purposes we will 
undertake to deconstruct the change in leverage to identify the origins of any existing effect and 
to further assess if it emerges from net equity issues, as suggested by previous studies into 
equity market timing. We will first report the net effect of market-to-book ratios on annual 
leverage changes, before deconstructing the leverage change itself.  
The market-to-book ratio serves as the primary focus of these regressions, but in order 
to create a benchmark set of control variables, a set of three control variables were included, 
drawing on the work of Rajan and Zingales (1995). Their paper proposes that asset tangibility, 
profitability and firm size are corelated to leverage in several developed countries. The market-
to-book ratio is related to both mispricing and investment opportunities, calculated as the book 
value of assets minus equity plus market equity, all divided by the book value of assets. 
Companies returning a ratio value above 10 are considered outliers and subsequently removed 
from our sample. Asset tangibility is normally associated with high values of leverage since 
tangible assets are typically used as collateral. This particular variable is defined as the net 
plant, property, and equipment (PPE), divided by the book value of assets.  
 Profitability on the other hand, if related to internal funds and linked to Myers and 
Majluf (1984)’s pecking order theory, which states that managers prefer internal funds to 
external, could subsequently be related to low levels of leverage. Another hypothesis comes 
from Jensen (1986), who states that profitable firms have more cash flow problems, while 
effective governance might require higher levels of leverage. Profitability is defined as 
EBITDA divided by the book value of assets.  
 Lastly, firm size is measured as the log of net sales, which we further complement with 
the assumption that if larger firms are less likely to enter financial distress, then size may 
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increase leverage. To test these different variables effects on the annual change in book 



































 The lagged leverage variable was included due to leverage being restricted to values 
between 0 and 1. When leverage is close to one of these values the ratio can only go one way, 
regardless of the values of our other variables. Controlling this variable allows us to ensure that 
the regression does not dilute other variable specific effects based solely on the effect of the 
leverage level.8 In order to analyze where the annual changes in leverage came from, leverage 
needs to be deconstructed into equity issues, newly retained earnings, and alterations in 
leverage, provided by asset growth through equity, debt issues, and retained earnings. An 
































































































































8 Tests without the lagged variable were performed, with the results demonstrating that no endogeneity 
problems arise from the inclusion of this variable. 
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 In the end these different regressions will ultimately articulate where the changes in 
leverage come from and if those changes are derived from equity issuing as suggested by the 
market equity timing theory. 
 
3.2.2 Factors of Leverage 
 
 After analyzing the short-term effects of the market-to-book ratio on leverage, this 
section will begin assessing the persistence of these effects in order to understand the cross-
sectional impact of leverage. Managers may use equity market timing as an opportunity then 
rebalance quickly, thus making the effect more noticeable in the short term, while effectively 
cancelling it out in the long term. In the case of managers that do not rebalance to a specific 
target leverage however, this theory will explain why the ratios and persistence effects differ. 
 In order to analyze these persistence effects, new regressions will be performed by 
utilizing the control variables we derived from Rajan and Zingales (1995). A new variable will 
be created within this section however, the external finance weighted average of market-to-
book, in order to assess relevant historical variations in market valuations. The market-to-book 






















 The summations begin at the IPO year, with e and d representing net equity and debt 
issues respectively, while being defined as previously stated.9 
 The external finance weighted average returns high values when a company that already 
possesses a high market-to-book ratio raises financing by external sources and returns low 
values when the reverse takes place. External finance represents opportunities to change levels 
of leverage, whether such opportunities are presented through debt or equity. 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 ratio 
gives more weight to valuations that prevailed when such financing decisions were being made, 
measuring the lags while allowing us to reflect upon the most important lagged observations. 
 Some important restrictions regarding this ratio were set out. The minimum weight was 
set to zero, while the ratio value itself was required to remain below 10, with any outliers being 
 
9 The weights each year are given by the sum of net debt and equity issues. 
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excluded. This first minimum weight restriction was applied to ensure the weighted average 
only increased during our set timeframe, and thus to verify that any weight increase is 
exclusively representative of times where the leverage was most expected to change. Therefore, 
a weight of zero will mean that this variable eliminates the market information for that specific 
year. 
 To test the univariate explanatory power of this weighted variable when compared to 
other factors, a set of different regressions was applied, relying upon the different IPO times in 







= 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
(7) 
 
 The 𝑋𝑡−1 variable represents the 4 different variables utilized by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and which were already incorporated in our previous regressions. 𝑋𝑡−1 will also further 
represent 4 new variables applied by Fama and French (2000), related to capital structure 
factors. Two of these are related to dividends, one is related to depreciation, and the last one is 
related to R&D. Dividends to book equity is equal to common stock dividends divided by the 
book value of equity, and these will be used as a proxy for profitability. As a proxy for 
investment opportunities the ratios are dividends to market equity and research and 
development which is R&D expenditures to book value of assets. The depreciation expense, 
calculated by dividing depreciation by the book value of assets, will provide us with the ratio 
necessary for our final proxy for nondebt tax shields. To compare the explanatory power of 
these different variables one is required to calculate the weighted averages of their individual 
historical values. 
 After this explanatory power is assessed, multivariate regressions can be performed on 

































 This new set of regressions allows us to perform the important process of inclusion of 
the normal lagged market-to-book ratio, ensuring that the weighted average will capture only 
effects derived from the residual past valuation, while the lagged values will capture current 
variations in the market-to-book ratio. The lagged ratio is more related to investment rather than 
perceived mispricing. Controlling for current investments enables past within-firm variation to 
improve the selection of what may have been perceived as market timing opportunities. 
 For testing if the coefficient of the external finance weighted average is sensitive to 
different control variables than the ones we relied upon earlier, another multivariate regression 
was performed using the control variables selected by Fama and French (2000). Some of these 
overlap with the ones we used in the previous multivariate regression. The different variables 
used were EBIT to assets, common dividends to book equity and market equity, depreciation 
to assets, R&D expenses scaled by assets, and firm size.10 All the variables were lagged as in 















































 This section will seek to provide even deeper insight. Our previous two sections 
illustrated the relationship between the market-to-book ratio and leverage in the short-term, 
along with assessing whether historical market valuations are associated with leverage. If there 
indeed exists a short- and long-term effect visible within the historical data, then the market-to-
book ratio can subsequently declared to be persistent. To conclude our empirical study, the 
magnitude of this persistence will be measured on this last step.  
We will primarily rely upon a regression analysis on the cumulative changes in leverage 
beginning in the pre-IPO year, using the Rajan and Zingales control variables. This regression 
will be performed as follows: 
 
10 The R&D expenses segment also possesses a second variable that was calculated with a dummy 









































 Since an IPO represents a critical event which is linked to the market valuation of a 
company, it is important to measure the changes in the dominant leverage before an IPO takes 
place, meaning that the pre-IPO leverage will be included within our dependent variable.  
 The last set of regressions performed in our study aim to demonstrate the direct 
persistence effect of past valuations on the current capital structure of a company. This set 





















































































+ 𝑓3 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆)𝑡+𝜏−1 + 𝑢3𝑡+𝜏 
(13) 
 
 The first regressions presented in this set differ from our previous regressions in that 
they measure the effect of the average value of the weighted ratio of the capital structure 
presented in t+1. While similar in format to our previous regressions, its application is oriented 
differently. Our second regression here will still controlling time through t, but it will further 
consider a new capital structure time through t+𝜏. This last regression has a significant change 
when compared to our previous ones, with the 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 measuring its effects through time t, 
while the regression itself aims to returns its results through 𝑡 + 𝜏 − 1. 𝜏 represents a company’s 




 Given all our previous regressions, this section will endeavor to explain within the 
context of market equity timing, those same OLS analyses. These regressions are noted in IPO 
years on our IPO sample (e.g., if the time in study is IPO+1 year, the lagged variables represent 
the IPO year). In our results section the order of our regressions results will follow the 
regression segment. 
 The annual changes in leverage will be the primary subject of our analysis. This first set 
of regressions is divided into 4 panels, with the first one analyzing which factors change annual 
leverage levels, while the next 3 will endeavor to explain where that changes comes from. 
 Table 2, panel A demonstrates that leverage and the market-to-book ratio possess 
negative correlation, with high values of market-to-book ratio typically leading to lower levels 
of leverage. By multiplying the coefficient and the sample standard deviation given by the 
independent variable, the total change can be measured. In our IPO+3 year this total change 
amounted to -1.2%, meaning that at the time of IPO+3, one unit increase in the market-to-book 
ratio will tend to result in a leverage decrease of almost 1.20%. Such results are consistent with 
the theory that managers tend to issue equity when the prices are high, but it does not properly 
explain where such change originates from. Regarding our other columns, asset tangibility and 
firm size tends to increase the leverage ratio by 0.15% and 2.2% respectively within the same 
year, while profitability typically reduces it by 1.3%. These results are consistent with previous 
studies performed by Baker, Wurgler or La Porta. 11 
 The next panel results conclusively demonstrate that changes in leverage through 
market-to-book ratio originates mostly from net equity issues. Furthermore, and concurring 
with previous studies by Marsh (1982) and other financial authors, panel B seems to suggest 
that the market-to-book ratio is highly significant to net equity issues. Panel C further shows 
that newly retained earnings are weakly related to the market-to-book ratio, thus rejecting the 
hypotheses that leverage is affected by market-to-book based on newly retained earnings. Panel 
D shows that growth in assets is positively related to market-to-book, thus increasing leverage 
levels through a positive effect. 12 All the distinct panels from B to D reflect the total effect of 
the market-to-book ratio, with the sum of all of these resulting in our panel A. 
 
11 Sample standard deviations will be presented in the appendix 
12 The effect of firm size is positive; however, this indicator does not change leverage one on one in the 
same manner that our others do. The derivate of leverage to net equity issues ratio increases net equity 

























































Ordinary least squared regressions (already identified on the paper as 1, 3, 4 and 5) of changes in the book leverage ratio. The independent variables 
are market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, firm size and lastly lagged leverage. The coefficients of a and f are not reported. Book 
leverage is book debt divided by assets. Market-to-book ratio is assets plus market equity minus book equity everything divided by book assets, 
this variable is lagged at all times, except in the IPO year, on that time is measure at time t. Firm-year observations with market-to-book ratio 
higher than 10 were dropped. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided 
by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. All independent variables are expressed in percentage terms except for market-to-book 
and firm size. Panel A presents the changes in leverage. Panel B presents net equity issues as dependent variable. Panel C presents newly retained 
earnings as dependent variable. Panel D presents growth in assets growth coming from equity. The regressions are robust and t-stat values are 
presented by the columns t().  
 
Panel A: Changes in Book Leverage (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
 
Year N b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 𝑅2 
IPO 3678 -1.77 -5.99 0.06 3.62 -0.09 -3.29 13.19 22.04 0.55 
IPO+1 3523 -0.85 -5.88 0.04 4.82 -0.11 -6.11 0.71 2.22 0.12 
IPO+3 2833 -0.75 -4.68 0.02 1.97 -0.06 -3.21 0.68 2.15 0.07 
IPO+5 2279 -0.93 -4.25 0.04 4.19 -0.06 -2.37 1.56 4.67 0.08 
IPO+10 1539 -0.69 -1.67 0.00 -0.21 0.01 0.35 0.36 0.94 0.07 
 
 
          
 
13 Correlation matrix with these variables is presented in the appendix 
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Panel B: Changes in Book Leverage Due to Equity Issues (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
 
Year N b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 𝑅2 
IPO 3678 -3.78 8.16 0.09 -3.70 0.20 -4.09 20.63 -24.03 0.37 
IPO+1 3523 -2.69 12.82 0.00 0.39 0.33 -12.25 3.93 -10.09 0.27 
IPO+3 2833 -3.96 12.00 -0.04 2.97 0.35 -5.17 1.70 -1.48 0.16 
IPO+5 2279 -3.82 10.79 -0.01 0.73 0.35 -8.24 1.72 -3.63 0.21 
IPO+10 1539 -3.82 5.52 -0.03 1.22 0.48 -3.74 0.35 -0.39 0.11 
           
Panel C: Changes in Book Leverage Due to Newly Retained Earnings (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
 
Year N b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 𝑅2 
IPO 3678 0.65 -1.89 0.01 -0.69 -0.31 6.63 -0.24 0.40 0.11 
IPO+1 3523 -0.56 2.82 -0.02 1.46 -0.71 15.26 -2.07 4.35 0.42 
IPO+3 2833 -0.23 0.69 0.00 0.33 -0.67 8.09 -0.25 0.18 0.24 
IPO+5 2279 -0.61 2.29 -0.02 0.89 -0.63 12.53 -0.49 0.60 0.14 
IPO+10 1539 0.26 -0.49 0.06 -1.42 -0.69 5.99 0.23 -0.23 0.13            
Panel D: Changes in Book Leverage Due to Changes in Assets (%)  
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
 
Year N b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 𝑅2 
IPO 3678 1.36 -6.00 -0.04 2.87 0.02 -0.90 -7.19 15.22 0.40 
IPO+1 3523 2.40 -12.07 0.07 -5.71 0.27 -9.21 -1.16 2.68 0.15 
IPO+3 2833 3.45 -13.60 0.06 -4.45 0.26 -6.40 -0.77 1.49 0.14 
IPO+5 2279 3.49 -11.71 0.07 -2.85 0.22 -5.95 0.33 -0.43 0.07 
IPO+10 1539 2.86 -6.35 -0.03 0.59 0.22 -4.08 -0.22 0.25 0.04 
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 Our final 3 columns comprise asset tangibility, profitability, and size. In a side analysis, 
the profitability column suggests that changes in leverage through profitability typically 
originate from retained earnings. Previous statements purport that profitable firms will tend to 
issue less equity, but this new result also suggests that this effect is instead balanced from the 
higher return earnings, reducing leverage. Another interesting pattern arises from our firm size 
variable, which returns large values for our IPO years, revealing that this variable seems to play 
an important role during these critical starting periods.  
 The effect of the market-to-book ratio on leverage in the short term is confirmed, 
allowing us to proceed to the analysis on long-term effects. This part required the creation of 
our external financing weighted average ratio as previously stated. Different plots tracing out 
the cross section of our R-squared values with different independent variables had to be created 
in order to examine the power of this weighted variable. In figure 1, the dashed lines in these 
plots represent the external financing weighted average ratio or efwa ratio, while the solid one 
represents the lagged one-year indicator. 
 Our average weighted ratio appears to hold more univariate explanatory power than the 
unweighted ratio. Panel A further suggests that market-to-book starts with an explanation power 
of roughly 20% of the capital structure and a with negative coefficient in both regressions as 
expected. 14 While the weighted average explanation suffered a slight decline at the start, this 
one held steady throughout the firm’s lifetime. This did not take place with the once-lagged 
market-to-book, which experienced decreased explanatory power as time progressed. As firms 
age, historical information becomes more relevant in explaining the capital structure, a 
conclusion supported by the increasing gap present between the solid and dashed line in our 
plots as time progresses. Both versions of asset tangibility in panel B on the other hand, 
presented low levels of explanatory power along with positive coefficients. 
 Profitability is presented in Panel C, although it has low explanatory power, this variable 
returned in these visual analyses the most peculiar results along with our market-to-book ratio, 
being the only variables whereby historical valuations had a significant increase on explanatory 
powers. Such results make sense in the context of our profitability variable only if the firm 
keeps the retained earnings instead of paying them out. Our weighted average variable includes 
not only the presented profitability, they further include the effect of previous ones which  
 
14 All the coefficients mentioned on this part of the paper will be presented in the next regression tables: 











= 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
Ordinary least squares regressions of book leverage regress with 8 different determinants of 
capital represented by the 8 different panels. Book leverage is debt divided by assets. From the 
8 different independent variables, they were defined in 2 different ways, one considers the 
weighted average of past external financing and the other is the simple lagged one-year values, 
the variables efwa is presented by the dashed line and the normal lagged by the solid line. 
External financing is the sum of net and debt issues, when this sum is negative the weight is set 
to 0. Market-to-book ratio is assets plus market equity minus book equity everything divided 
by book assets, firm-year observations with market-to-book ratio higher than 10 were dropped. 
Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by assets. 
Profitability is EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. Scaled 
by book and market equity are the common dividends. Depreciation expense is divided by 









































directly affect retained earnings values. These effects of past profitability have already been 
widely discussed within the literature, notably within Wessels and Titman (1988) paper titled 
“The determinants of capital structure”. Our size variable demonstrates some ability to explain 
younger firms, but that explanation power decreases a lot with time, with the normal and 
weighted ratios showing only marginal differences in this variable, with positive coefficients in 
both. Both dividend ratios along with depreciation (Panels E, F and G) appear to possess very 
little explanatory power, with none of them returning an R-square larger than 3.5%. R&D 
expenses returned a negative coefficient, and while it explains almost 10% of the capital 
structure, our weighted average scheme does not seem to improve this variable’s explanatory 
power. Figure 1 simply suggests that capital structure results from several factors when a firm 
performs an IPO. As companies get older the cross section of leverage is further clarified by 
past choices, and while this historic data does not affect all our control variables, it does add 
value to the market-to-book and profitability variables. 
 After assessing the explanatory power of all our control variables, both weighted and 
unweighted ratios, our next step is to check if the effect of the market-to-book ratio is notable 
over the long term.  
 Table 3 demonstrates that 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 is both more consistent and stronger than the once 
lagged market-to-book ratio, with this difference being even more visible in the book leverage, 
represented in panel A. The normal lagged market-to-book ratio has little explanatory power 
for younger companies, losing this power almost entirely as they age, while the 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 ratio 
demonstrates an almost opposite behavior, the signal getting even stronger and with larger 
negative coefficients over time. Furthermore, market leverage has a mechanical association 
with the market-to-book ratio, which can explain its larger values in our Panel B, particularly 
when compared to panel A. 
 The 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 ratio is our most important economic variable. In our IPO+3 year row, a 
single standard increase in this indicator implies a decrease in book leverage of around 9%, 
with the same decrease taking place in market leverage. The biggest increase originates from 
our size variable, whereby a one unit increase in standard deviation is associated with an 
increase of almost 6% in the book leverage, along with 3,6% in market leverage. Consistent 
with Figure 1, the effect of past valuations on the capital structure becomes clearer over time. 
Our IPO+10 row demonstrates that the effect of 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 is even more pronounced than in 
previous years, with one standard deviation increase leading to a decrease of nearly 20% in 
































+ 𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆)𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
Ordinary least squared regressions (identified on the paper as 8) of changes in the book and market leverage ratio, the independent variables are 
market-to-book ratios, asset tangibility, profitability and firm size. The coefficients of a are not reported. Book leverage is book debt divided by 
assets. Market leverage as book debt to assets plus market equity minus book equity. Market-to-book ratio is defined in 2 different methods. The 
first one is the external finance weighted average from t-1. The external finance of net debt and equity issues distribute the weights. When the 
external finance is negative the weight equals 0. The other t-1 market-to-book is assets plus market equity minus book equity everything divided 
by assets lagged for all years. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided 
by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. Asset tangibility and profitability are expressed in percentage terms. Panel A shows the 
results for book leverage. Panel B shows the results for the market leverage dependent. The regressions are robust and t-stat values are presented 
by the columns t(). 
 
Panel A: Book Leverage (%) 
 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡−1 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
Year b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 
IPO+1 - - -2.58 -10.39 0.11 6.28 -0.16 -5.37 10.60 16.93 
IPO+3 -2.44 -6.67 -0.74 -1.87 0.12 7.24 -0.26 -8.47 11.68 20.48 
IPO+5 -3.08 -8.42 -0.46 -1.14 0.12 6.58 -0.29 -8.48 11.07 17.17 






Panel B: Market Leverage (%) 
 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡−1 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
Year b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 
IPO+1 - - -5.96 -27.68 0.15 9.01 -0.12 -5.44 7.22 13.62 
IPO+3 -2.72 -7.6 -5.90 -14.75 0.15 8.92 -0.14 -6.50 7.36 13.28 
IPO+5 -6.28 -9.32 -5.95 -12.54 0.18 9.08 -0.17 -5.72 6.16 9.75 
IPO+10 -10.38 -10.72 -6.99 -12.05 0.11 4.85 -0.23 -4.62 5.21 7.52 
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variable, the largest effect on IPO+10 originates from profitability, with an approximately 11% 
decrease in both book and market leverage.15 
 Table 4 demonstrates the regressions undertaken with the control variables suggested 
by Fama and French (2000). As previously stated, the aim in this case is to find out whether  
𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 is sensitive to changes in our control variables. The results of these regressions are 
presented in the next table. 
 Similarly to previous results, the biggest change in our IPO+10 book and market 
leverage columns comes from the 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 ratio, while the second biggest change originates 
from profitability. Table 4 also suggests that this ratio is not sensitive to changes in our control 
variables. Tables 3 and 4 further demonstrate that historical values possess a significant effect 
on leverage and in a different manner and magnitude to that previously reported within the 
literature. The last part of our results is related to persistence, with Table 5 representing the 
cumulative changes of leverage from the pre-IPO year. 
 The results of the coefficients and significance values in Table 5 do not differ much 
from Table 3. This concurrence serves to provide further data suggesting that valuations 
influence capital structure in a way that perseveres and accumulates over time. It further 
suggests that the average weighed ratio is unlikely to reflect an omitted variable that could 
possess an effect on initial leverage levels. Furthermore, and similarly to our previous results, 
a 1 unit increase in our 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 ratio leads to a decrease in the book and leverage ratio greater 
than that of any other independent variable. 
 Table 6 tested the persistence of the market-to-book ratio in a different manner, applying 
Fama-Macbeth regressions for each year through a set of 3 regressions. These regressions 
contained only firms that survived 𝜏 years in order to ensure that coefficients represented a 
consistent sample of the same firms, resulting on a total of roughly 90 regressions alone, without 
the survival subsample regressions. These Fama-Macbeth regressions were performed with the 
aid of a Stata package which enables the application of different conditions on multiple 
regressions of this specific type. 
Table 6 presents the different coefficients and t-stats gained from our performance of 
the Fama-Macbeth regressions, along with the 2 coefficient ratios. The ratios b2/b1 and b3/b1 
will measure the effects in long-term oscillations in the market-to-book ratio. 
 
15 Sample standard deviations will be presented in the appendix. 
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+ 𝑖 𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑗 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴)𝑡−1
+ 𝑢𝑡 
 
Ordinary least squared regression (already identified on the paper as 9) of changes in the book and market leverage ratio, the independent variables 
are variables suggested by Fama and French theirs 2000’s paper. Coefficients a is not reported. Book leverage is book debt divided by assets. 
Market leverage as book debt to assets plus market equity minus book equity. Market-to-book ratio is defined in 2 different methods. The first one 
is the external finance weighted average from t-1. The external finance of net debt and equity issues distribute the weights. When the external 
finance is negative the weight equals 0. The other t-1 market-to-book is assets plus market equity minus book equity everything divided by assets 
lagged for all years. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided by assets. 
Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. Common dividends is divided by book equity and market equity. Depreciation expense is divided 
by assets. R&D is divided by assets. RDD is a dummy variable that turns into 0 if a company did R&D expenses on the year in study. All 
independent variables are expressed in percentage terms except for both market-to-books, iRDD and firm size. EBIT is scaled to assets. Panel A 
shows the results for book leverage. Panel B shows the results for the market leverage dependent. The regressions are robust and t-stat values are 
presented by the columns t(). 
 
Panel A: Book Leverage (%) 
 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡−1 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝐸𝑇/𝐴 𝑡−1 𝐷𝑖𝑣/𝐵𝐸𝑡−1 𝐷𝑖𝑣/𝑀𝐸𝑡−1 𝐷𝑝/𝐴𝑡−1 𝑅𝐷/𝐴𝑡−1 𝑖𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 log (𝐴)𝑡−1 
Year b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) 
IPO+1 - - -2.35 -9.59 -0.05 -1.73 0.09 5.27 0.02 0.77 0.70 5.24 -0.12 -2.36 -7.65 -8.00 7.16 10.29 
IPO+3 -2.42 -6.12 -0.40 -0.85 -0.17 -3.66 0.08 2.51 0.01 0.12 0.33 1.66 -0.16 -1.82 -7.32 -7.38 8.93 14.51 
IPO+5 -3.21 -8.24 -0.94 -2.10 -0.14 -2.15 0.00 7.31 0.08 0.59 0.44 2.44 -0.05 -0.53 -6.84 -6.33 9.22 13.85 





Panel B: Market Leverage (%) 
 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡−1 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝐸𝑇/𝐴 𝑡−1 𝐷𝑖𝑣/𝐵𝐸𝑡−1 𝐷𝑖𝑣/𝑀𝐸𝑡−1 𝐷𝑝/𝐴𝑡−1 𝑅𝐷/𝐴𝑡−1 𝑖𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 log (𝐴)𝑡−1 
Year b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) 
IPO+1 - - -5.59 -26.55 -0.09 -3.34 0.03 3.10 0.02 1.27 0.39 3.04 -0.26 -4.51 -6.51 -7.05 5.90 9.12 
IPO+3 -2.70 -7.57 -5.08 -12.17 -0.16 -4.40 0.00 0.15 0.23 3.32 0.12 0.93 -0.30 -4.14 -6.67 -6.84 5.97 9.92 
IPO+5 -6.03 -8.99 -5.37 -10.36 -0.16 -2.27 0.00 2.40 0.12 0.78 0.14 1.34 -0.27 -2.77 -6.89 -6.64 5.72 8.71 











































Ordinary least squared regression (identified on the paper as 10) of cumulative changes in the book and market leverage ratio since pre-IPO, the 
independent variables are market-to-book ratios, asset tangibility, profitability and firm size.  The coefficients of a and g are not reported. Book 
leverage is book debt divided by assets. Market leverage as book debt to assets plus market equity minus book equity. Market-to-book ratio is 
defined in 2 different methods. The first one is the external finance weighted average from t-1. The external finance of net debt and equity issues 
distribute the weights. When the external finance is negative the weight equals 0. The other t-1 market-to-book is assets plus market equity minus 
book equity everything divided by assets lagged for all years. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by assets. 
Profitability is EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. Asset tangibility and profitability are expressed in 
percentage terms except for firm size. Panel A shows the results for book leverage. Panel B shows the results for the market leverage dependent. 
The regressions are robust and t-stat values are presented by the columns t(). 
 
Panel A: Book Leverage (%)  
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡−1 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
Year b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 
IPO+1 - - -2.88 -8.29 0.12 6.02 -0.19 -3.99 9.97 12.79 
IPO+3 -2.35 -5.05 -0.85 -1.51 0.15 7.89 -0.35 -7.26 11.27 15.59 
IPO+5 -3.82 -7.35 0.20 0.36 0.17 7.77 -0.42 -7.33 10.61 12.77 






Panel B: Market Leverage (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡−1 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴𝑡−1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴/𝐴𝑡−1 log (𝑆)𝑡−1 
Year b t(b) b t(b) c t(c) d t(d) e t(e) 
IPO+1 - - -6.17 -18.91 0.11 5.65 -0.19 -3.87 7.89 10.34 
IPO+3 -2.53 -5.59 -6.63 -11.90 0.15 7.02 -0.24 -5.77 8.34 11.21 
IPO+5 -6.33 -7.17 -5.53 -8.03 0.19 7.71 -0.30 -5.48 6.79 7.72 



















































































+ 𝑓3 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆)𝑡+𝜏−1 + 𝑢3𝑡+𝜏 
 
Fama-Macbeth regressions (already identified on the paper as 11,12 and 13) of actual and future leverage on the market-to-book ratio, the 
independent variables are market-to-book ratios, asset tangibility, profitability and firm size. The only coefficients reported are b1, b2, b3 and c3. 
Book leverage is book debt divided by assets. Market leverage as book debt to assets plus market equity minus book equity. The persistence of 
market-to-book ratio is defined by dividing b2 and b3 to b1. Since the sample has 30 years, it was done a set of 3 regressions for each year. On the 
different sets are only included firms that survived 𝜏 years, that way each coefficient is calculated for the same sample of firms. Market-to-book 
ratio is defined in 2 different methods. The first one is the external finance weighted average from t-1. The external finance of net debt and equity 
issues distribute the weights. When the external finance is negative the weight equals 0. The other t-1 market-to-book is assets plus market equity 
minus book equity everything divided by assets lagged for all years. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by 
assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. Panel A shows the results for book leverage. Panel 







Panel A: Book Leverage (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡 Coefficient 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑟−1 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -3.98 -11.62 -3.98 -11.62 -3.98 -11.62 -0.55 -2.08 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -4.40 -18.35 -3.89 -22.07 -3.21 -15.52 -0.73 -2.01 0.88 0.73 
t+5 -4.59 -15.76 -4.24 -16.37 -3.52 -16.63 -0.34 -1.10 0.92 0.77 
t+10 -4.21 -10.99 -3.76 -12.10 -3.51 -10.50 0.13 0.36 0.89 0.83 
 
 
Panel B: Market Leverage (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡 Coefficient 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑟−1 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -3.22 -7.75 -3.22 -7.75 -3.22 -7.75 -4.13 -12.38 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -3.27 -20.23 -3.26 -21.99 -4.60 -11.91 -6.53 -17.65 1.00 1.41 
t+5 -3.16 -15.99 -3.15 -16.14 -4.46 -10.85 -6.60 -17.92 1.00 1.41 
t+10 -3.08 -15.09 -3.07 -15.05 -3.89 -18.41 -6.98 -28.41 1.00 1.26 
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The set of firms remained the same for all 3 regressions in our annual categories. One 
should keep in mind that as a selection criteria in our models, a firm must survive the same 
number of years as 𝜏 or more, thus leading to b1 being directly affected by 𝜏.  
 Our b1 coefficient has returned small and tight values, the range of b1 book values 
varies between -3.98 and -4.59, thus demonstrating that b1’s survival effect is small. The 
coefficients b2 and b3 serve as measurements of 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎’s persistence, with their results 
confirming the persistence of this ratio as being strongly significant for a 10-year minimum. 
Our b3 coefficient returned impressive results, suggesting that this determinant remains strong 
even past the 10 IPO-year mark. Our coefficients for the book ratio c3 are also smaller than b3, 
suggesting that the historical trail of this variable with data older than 10 years has more of an 
impact on the actual capital structure, than the present market-to-book ratio. Even in the panel 
B these 2 variables have considerable close values given the mechanical correlation between 
the variables talked previously. 
 Our b2/b1 coefficient ratios column provide us with further information on the market-
to-book beginning effect levels that remains after 𝜏 years. One can see from our book leverage 
results that the initial effect after 10 years remains 0.89, meaning that 89% of the initial effect 
still persists even beyond a decade. In our market leverage variable, the effect is 100% 
permanent, with the results in the last 2 columns returning virtually identical values. 
 All these analyses demonstrate that market valuations possess a significant and 
persistent effect on actual capital structures of companies, and that this effect is not influenced 
by our control variables, thus suggesting that it could work as a universal strategy. Our appendix 
will provide additional tables with further information which follows the main aim of this study, 
while also providing a robustness check on market equity timing in different sic codes, as 











5. Discussion and Limitations 
 
 Given the theories discussed in the literature review section, along with the results we 
obtained, this segment will assess whether these results can be explained by the different 
theories we reviewed in the literature review, while identifying some limitations in the model 
which may influence our final results. 
 When considering adjustment costs within the trade-off theory, it becomes clear that 
capital structures adjust slowly over time to correct for changes in the market-to-book ratio. 
Under this theory, on table 6 the 𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 ratio past momentary fluctuations measured at time 
t are no longer relevant and variables as b2 and b3 should be 0 for measuring distant future 
capital structures, the results did not verify these assumptions. Additionally, table 6 served to 
illustrate that fluctuations in the market-to-book ratio possess a significant higher impact than 
expected for periods of up to a decade and beyond. Furthermore, Tables 3 and 4 support the 
notion that past fluctuations are of greater importance than various current variables, thus 
rendering adjustment costs within a span of 10 years not worthwhile. We further demonstrated 
that a portion of this variation has little if anything to do with optimum targets, suggesting that 
this theory has little overall use for the purposes of explaining our results. 
 Pecking order theory was another theory that failed to concur with our results. 
According to this theory, companies with improved market-to-book ratios would most likely 
experience a decline in leverage duo to newly retained earnings, but the results we obtained do 
not show such behavior. Our results suggest instead that the decline comes from net equity 
issues. Furthermore, Myers suggests the existence of an association between investment and 
future leverage, while the results of our work demonstrate a powerful and persistent relationship 
between historical values and the market-to-book ratio. 
 Managerial entrenchment theory is significantly more of a theoretical framework than 
the other notions and ideas analyzed in our literature review. Our own analysis along with the 
results we obtained above, offer significant support to the work done by the authors of this 
theory, particularly in terms of the long returns after the issuing and repurchasing of equity.  
 The Market timing theory eventually emerged as the one concept closest to explaining 
the totality of the results we obtained in our analysis, which appears to confirm its significance 
as a feature of financial decisions, as stated in our literature review. We should of course hesitate 
to eliminate all other possible theories. Nevertheless, this theory states that actual capital 
structures are derived from the accumulation of CEOs’ past attempts to time the equity market, 
concurring with the results of our study. 
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 Finally, it is of relevance and importance to point out some limitations which could 
influence the results of this investigation. Our study was performed solely on US companies 
which undertook IPO’s within the last 30 years. Although other authors have undertaken studies 
that have covered different time spans, the choice of timeframe along with the place of study 
can affect these results with relative ease, performing the same study in the UK or Germany 
would most likely change the results obtained.  
 Future improvements in this study could be obtained by changing our sample of IPO 
years. Although 10 years represents a robust choice for the majority of companies in study, 
increasing the timeframe under research even further would likely yield even more interesting 
results. Likewise, the sample of our study could improve with the incorporation of premium 
databases such as that of the Security Data Company, allowing for further assessment of the 

























 Traditional models in finance, have provided explanations in the past as to why 
switching opportunistically between debt or equity will not bring gains to a firm. On the 
contrary, evidence from this investigation on the diverse financial decisions following the 
issuing and repurchasing of equity suggests that equity market timing is an important aspect of 
real financial policy. In order to assess the influence of market timing on capital structures, it 
appears clear that the market-to-book ratio is an important measure for managers in perceiving 
market timing opportunities. We also found evidence that managers attempt to issue equity 
when the valuation of a company is high on the market, and refrain from doing so when the 
opposite is true. Furthermore, variations in a firm’s valuation had very persistent effects on 
actual capital structures. All of these discoveries found throughout the course of our work are 
difficult to reconcile with traditional models of capital structure. The best explanation for the 
totality of our findings is that capital structure is the incremental outcome derived from all 
managers’ historical attempts within that firm to time the equity market, thus ruling out theories 
regarding optimal capital structures. Market equity timing shows both significance and power 


















7. Robustness Check 
 
 This robustness check section is comprised of an analysis of persistence tests realized 
separately to different sic codes, with the persistence tests being derived from applying Fama 
Macbeth’s model for the set of 3 regressions presented in our persistence section of this paper. 
For our purposes, the full sample is divided into 5 different industry portfolios, a division drawn 
from Kenneth French’s data library. 16  These portfolios thus distinguish between consumer 
industry (1st portfolio), manufacturing (2nd portfolio), high-tech (3rd portfolio), health (4th 
portfolio), and others (5th portfolio), with this last one containing the rest of the sample, 
including entertainment, transportation, construction, and many other company types. The 
analysis of these portfolios was performed in the same way as in our previous analyses, with 
the indicators presenting the same market-to-book and capital structure aspects. On table 7 and 
12 the different regression panels represent the different sic code industries.17 
 Concurring with our previous results, coefficients b2 and b3 measure the persistence of 
𝑀/𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎 and once more confirm the persistence of this ratio in virtually every portfolio for the 
last 10 years. The analysis of our portfolios returned high coefficients with considerable levels 
of significance, particularly for book values which do not possess any mechanical relation with 
the leverage variable. Our b3 variable also returned exceptionally strong values. The poorest 
outcomes in this analysis emerged from our 5th portfolio, which despite showing significance 
in past recent years on the book values, lost some level of strength and significance as the group 
industry aged, however by practical terms is still permanent. Furthermore, a deep analysis into 
the book ratios revealed that for all cases except our 5th portfolio oldest companies, the value 
of b3 is many times bigger than c3. This result suggests that data older than 10 years have more 
of an impact on capital structures than the actual market-to-book ratio and although the 5th 
portfolio will likely loose this persistence within the next years, the values are still persistence. 
 Our coefficients ratios columns provide information on the beginning effects that persist 
after 𝜏 years, with book leverage these initial effects seem to persist even after 10 years for all 
our portfolios. The effect is also permanent in market leverage, with the results in our last 2 
columns returning similarly high percentage values. All these analyses appear to demonstrate 
conclusively that market valuations have a persistent impact on a firm’s capital structure and 
that this effect is not influenced by the different industries in which a given company may be 
incorporated.
 
16 The all sic-code division is presented in the appendix 




Table 7: Robustness Check – Book Leverage  
 
Fama-Macbeth regressions (already mentioned on the paper as 11,12 and 13) of actual and future leverage on the market-to-book ratio, the 
independent variables are market-to-book ratios, asset tangibility, profitability and firm size. The only coefficients reported are b1, b2, b3 and c3. 
Book leverage is book debt divided by assets. Market leverage as book debt to assets plus market equity minus book equity. The persistence of 
market-to-book ratio is defined by dividing b2 and b3 to b1. Since the sample has 30 years, it was done a set of 3 regressions for each year. On the 
different sets are only included firms that survived 𝜏 years, that way each coefficient is calculated for the same sample of firms. Market-to-book 
ratio is defined in 2 different methods. The first one is the external finance weighted average from t-1. The external finance of net debt and equity 
issues distribute the weights. When the external finance is negative the weight equals 0. The other t-1 market-to-book is assets plus market equity 
minus book equity everything divided by assets lagged for all years. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by 
assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. The 5 different panels represent the book leverage 
values on 5 different portfolios. The regressions are robust and t-stat values are presented by the columns t(). 
 
 
1st Portfolio (%) 
  𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡 Coefficient 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑟−1 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -4.72 -7.76 -4.72 -7.76 -4.72 -7.76 -0.44 -0.60 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -4.51 -10.5 -5.15 -9.09 -4.04 -8.18 0.56 0.97 1.14 0.90 
t+5 -4.64 -10.47 -5.62 -9.43 -4.74 -9.08 1.35 3.05 1.21 1.02 







2nd Portfolio (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡 Coefficient 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑟−1 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -3.98 -11.62 -3.98 -11.62 -3.98 -11.62 -0.06 -0.05 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -5.24 -7.44 -5.85 -7.21 -4.92 -4.66 -0.04 -0.04 1.12 0.94 
t+5 -6.27 -7.94 -7.08 -8.72 -6.34 -7.21 0.89 0.77 1.13 1.01 
t+10 -9.60 -11.99 -10.39 -11.59 -9.39 -11.89 4.00 4.32 1.08 0.98 
 
 
3rd Portfolio (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡 Coefficient 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑟−1 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -3.27 -6.41 -3.27 -6.41 -3.27 -6.41 -0.02 -0.04 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -3.08 -9.84 -3.28 -11.00 -3.34 -7.60 1.18 1.76 1.07 1.08 
t+5 -3.80 -6.25 -4.12 -6.44 -3.38 -7.30 0.76 1.37 1.08 0.89 
t+10 -2.06 -7.01 -2.67 -9.07 -2.60 -4.62 0.31 0.41 1.30 1.27 
 
 
4th Portfolio (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡 Coefficient 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑟−1 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -2.61 -6.78 -2.61 -6.78 -2.61 -6.78 -1.15 -2.35 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -2.12 -7.9 -2.81 -8.78 -2.83 -6.08 -0.74 -2.06 1.32 1.33 
t+5 -1.87 -5.85 -2.15 -6.43 -2.43 -8.09 -0.88 -2.45 1.15 1.30 




5th Portfolio (%) 
 
𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑤𝑎,𝑡 Coefficient 𝑀𝑡𝐵𝑡+𝑟−1 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -3.42 -2.74 -3.42 -2.74 -3.42 -2.74 1.90 0.99 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -2.10 -2.77 -3.27 -3.90 -2.72 -3.52 2.64 1.30 1.55 1.30 
t+5 -1.67 -4.02 -2.51 -4.72 -1.85 -2.76 2.30 1.06 1.51 1.11 
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix 
Correlation matrix with the variables used in the regression “Determinants of change in 
leverage” and the summary statistics. Book leverage is book debt divided by assets. Market-to-
book ratio is assets plus market equity minus book equity everything divided by book assets, 
this variable is lagged at all times, except in the IPO year, on that time is measure at time t. 
Firm-year observations with market-to-book ratio higher than 10 were dropped. Asset 
Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by assets. Profitability is 
EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. New debt issues is 
calculated by dividing residual change in assets thru assets. Net equity issues is book equity 
minus change in retained earnings all divided by assets. Newly retained earnings is defined as 
change in retained earnings split by assets. 
 
 
𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕 𝒆/𝑨𝒕 ∆𝑹𝑬/𝑨𝒕 𝒅/𝑨𝒕 𝑷𝑷𝑬/𝑨𝒕 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝑫𝑨/𝑨𝒕 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝑺)𝒕 𝑫/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 ∆𝑫/𝑨 
𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕 1 
        
𝒆/𝑨𝒕 0.1662* 1 
       
∆𝑹𝑬/𝑨𝒕 0.0054 -0.7018* 1 
      
𝒅/𝑨𝒕 -0.2232* -0.3674* -0.2852* 1 
     
𝑷𝑷𝑬/𝑨𝒕 -0.2136* -0.0523* 0.0668* -0.0197* 1 
    
𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝑫𝑨/𝑨𝒕 0.0588* -0.2059* 0.3494* -0.1613* 0.1557* 1 
   
𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝑺)𝒕 -0.0814* -0.1752* 0.1481* 0.0242* 0.0660* 0.3524* 1 
  
𝑫/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 -0.1795* 0.0130* 0.0597* 0.0830* 0.1546* 0.0677* 0.2959* 1 
 
















Table 9: Standard Deviation of Determinants of Change in Leverage 
 
Standard deviations on the least squared regressions (already mentioned on the paper as 1, 3, 4 
and 5) of changes in the book leverage ratio, the independent variables are market-to-book ratio, 
asset tangibility, profitability, firm size and lastly lagged leverage. Book leverage is book debt 
divided by assets. Market-to-book ratio is assets plus market equity minus book equity 
everything divided by book assets, this variable is lagged at all times, except in the IPO year, 
on that time is measure at time t. Firm-year observations with market-to-book ratio higher than 
10 were dropped. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by 
assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales.  
 
Year 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕−𝟏 𝑷𝑷𝑬/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝑫𝑨/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝑺)𝒕−𝟏 
IPO 2.9494 16.188 28.465 5.9864 
IPO+1 1.4475 8.8221 17.5605 3.2095 
IPO+3 1.5945 8.8181 19.8308 3.1872 
IPO+5 2.1947 9.2958 25.2844 3.3319 






















Table 10: Standard Deviation of Factors in Leverage 
 
Standard deviations on the least squared regressions (already mentioned on the paper as 8) of 
changes in the book and market leverage ratio, the independent variables are market-to-book 
ratios, asset tangibility, profitability and firm size. Book leverage is book debt divided by assets. 
Market leverage as book debt to assets plus market equity minus book equity. Market-to-book 
ratio is defined in 2 different methods. The first one is the external finance weighted average 
from t-1. The external finance of net debt and equity issues distribute the weights. When the 
external finance is negative the weight equals 0. The other t-1 market-to-book is assets plus 
market equity minus book equity everything divided by assets lagged for all years. Asset 
Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by assets. Profitability is 
EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales.  
 
Panel A: Book Leverage 
Year 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒘𝒂,𝒕−𝟏 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕−𝟏 𝑷𝑷𝑬/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝑫𝑨/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝑺)𝒕−𝟏 
IPO+1 - 2.49 17.82 29.39 0.63 
IPO+3 3.66 3.98 17.12 31.02 0.57 
IPO+5 3.84 4.09 18.15 33.83 0.64 
IPO+10 3.51 5.79 22.56 48.94 0.70 
 
 
Panel B: Market Leverage 
Year 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒘𝒂,𝒕−𝟏 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕−𝟏 𝑷𝑷𝑬/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝑫𝑨/𝑨𝒕−𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝑺)𝒕−𝟏 
IPO+1 - 2.15 16.82 22.08 0.53 
IPO+3 3.57 4.00 17.32 22.03 0.55 
IPO+5 3.13 4.74 19.37 30.42 0.63 















Table 11: Sic Code Portfolios 
Sic code division for the different 5 industry portfolios. This division is presented on Kenneth’s 
French library and it’s the division they use to perform return studies and analyze different 
portfolios. 
 
1 Cnsmr (Consumer Durables, NonDurables, Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, 
Repair Shops)) 
          0100-0999 
          2000-2399 
          2700-2749 
          2770-2799 
          3100-3199 
          3940-3989 
          2500-2519 
          2590-2599 
          3630-3659 
          3710-3711 
          3714-3714 
          3716-3716 
          3750-3751 
          3792-3792 
          3900-3939 
          3990-3999 
          5000-5999 
          7200-7299 
          7600-7699 
 2 Manuf (Manufacturing, Energy, and Utilities) 
          2520-2589 
          2600-2699 
          2750-2769 
          2800-2829 
          2840-2899 
          3000-3099 
          3200-3569 
          3580-3621 
          3623-3629 
          3700-3709 
          3712-3713 
          3715-3715 
          3717-3749 
          3752-3791 
          3793-3799 
          3860-3899 
          1200-1399 
          2900-2999 
          4900-4949 
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 3 HiTec (Business Equipment, Telephone and Television Transmission) 
          3570-3579 
          3622-3622 Industrial controls 
          3660-3692 
          3694-3699 
          3810-3839 
          7370-7372 Services - computer programming and data processing 
          7373-7373 Computer integrated systems design 
          7374-7374 Services - computer processing, data prep 
          7375-7375 Services - information retrieval services 
          7376-7376 Services - computer facilities management service 
          7377-7377 Services - computer rental and leasing 
          7378-7378 Services - computer maintanence and repair 
          7379-7379 Services - computer related services 
          7391-7391 Services - R&D labs 
          8730-8734 Services - research, development, testing labs 
          4800-4899 
 4 Hlth (Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs) 
          2830-2839 
          3693-3693 
          3840-3859 
          8000-8099 
 5 Other (Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment, Finance, etc.) 





Table 12: Robustness Check – Market Leverage 
 
Fama-Macbeth regressions (already mentioned on the paper as 11,12 and 13) of actual and future leverage on the market-to-book ratio, the 
independent variables are market-to-book ratios, asset tangibility, profitability and firm size. The only coefficients reported are b1, b2, b3 and c3. 
Book leverage is book debt divided by assets. Market leverage as book debt to assets plus market equity minus book equity. The persistence of 
market-to-book ratio is defined by dividing b2 and b3 to b1. Since the sample has 30 years, it was done a set of 3 regressions for each year. On the 
different sets are only included firms that survived 𝜏 years, that way each coefficient is calculated for the same sample of firms. Market-to-book 
ratio is defined in 2 different methods. The first one is the external finance weighted average from t-1. The external finance of net debt and equity 
issues distribute the weights. When the external finance is negative the weight equals 0. The other t-1 market-to-book is assets plus market equity 
minus book equity everything divided by assets lagged for all years. Asset Tangibility equals PPE (net property, plant and equipment) divided by 
assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided by assets. Firm size is composed by the log of net sales. The 5 different panels represent the market values 
on 5 different portfolios. The regressions are robust and t-stat values are presented by the columns t(). 
 
1st Portfolio (%) 
  𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒘𝒂,𝒕 Coefficient 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕+𝒓−𝟏 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -4.31 -4.75 -4.31 -4.75 -4.31 -4.75 -5.13 -10.61 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -3.44 -7.76 -3.56 -8.28 -5.37 -6.59 -5.32 -9.17 1.04 1.56 
t+5 -3.25 -8.85 -3.32 -10.15 -4.57 -8.39 -6.06 -9.89 1.02 1.41 
t+10 -2.82 -5.6 -2.86 -8.32 -3.62 -6.09 -6.16 -10.41 1.01 1.28 
 
2nd Portfolio (%) 
 
𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒘𝒂,𝒕 Coefficient 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕+𝒓−𝟏 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -2.36 -1.38 -2.36 -1.38 -2.36 -1.38 -8.29 -4.32 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -4.55 -6.69 -4.57 -6.15 -5.61 -6.66 -11.02 -7.50 1.01 1.24 
t+5 -5.30 -6.74 -5.36 -6.95 -6.75 -9.64 -10.67 -7.96 1.01 1.27 
t+10 -8.63 -8.14 -8.17 -9.32 -9.71 -9.19 -7.43 -8.25 0.95 1.13 
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3rd Portfolio (%) 
  𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒘𝒂,𝒕 Coefficient 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕+𝒓−𝟏 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -3.08 -5.86 -3.08 -5.86 -3.08 -5.86 -2.22 -3.06 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -3.33 -6.78 -2.65 -7.52 -4.71 -5.78 -3.44 -4.95 0.80 1.41 
t+5 -3.45 -6.97 -3.00 -6.61 -4.24 -5.83 -4.25 -6.19 0.87 1.23 
t+10 -2.14 -10.46 -1.92 -7.37 -2.74 -7.08 -6.44 -8.77 0.90 1.28 
 
4th Portfolio (%) 
  𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒘𝒂,𝒕 Coefficient 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕+𝒓−𝟏 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -2.36 -6.12 -2.36 -6.12 -2.36 -6.12 -3.05 -6.16 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -2.25 -7.47 -1.92 -7.47 -3.50 -8.94 -2.91 -10.30 0.85 1.56 
t+5 -1.94 -5.47 -1.63 -4.98 -2.87 -8.5 -3.60 -7.51 0.84 1.48 
t+10 -2.76 -5.09 -2.22 -4.85 -3.49 -4.74 -3.96 -6.13 0.80 1.26 
 
5th Portfolio (%) 
  𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒘𝒂,𝒕 Coefficient 𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒕+𝒓−𝟏 Coefficient Coefficient Ratios 
Year b1 t(b1) b2 t(b2) b3 t(b3) c3 t(c3) b2/b1 b3/b1 
t+1 -3.81 -4.19 -3.81 -4.19 -3.81 -4.19 -4.47 -2.59 1.00 1.00 
t+3 -4.01 -4.12 -3.76 -4.57 -5.44 -4.45 -6.43 -3.5 0.94 1.36 
t+5 -3.10 -6.86 -3.23 -3.83 -5.05 -4.26 -6.24 -3.41 1.04 1.63 
t+10 -2.87 -5.71 -2.51 -4.38 -3.58 -5.44 -6.74 -3.20 0.87 1.25 
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Table 13: Variable Construction 
Construction of the most importable variables used throughout the analysis. The data numbers 
are referring to the COMPUSTAT variable list items. The computation of this variables was 





Total Assets [data6] – Total Liabilities [data181] – Preferred 
Stock [data10] + Deferred Taxes [data35] + Convertible Debt 
[data79]. If Preferred Stock [data10] is missing, is replaced with 
Redemption Value of Preferred Stock [data56] 
Book Debt Total Assets [data6] – Book Equity  
Book Leverage Book Debt / Total Assets [data6] * 100 
Market Equity Common Shares Outstanding [data25] * Price [data199] 
Market Leverage 
Book Debt / (Total Assets [data6] – Book Equity + Market 
Equity) * 100 
Net Equity Issues (e) 
(ΔBook Equity – ΔBalance Sheet Retained Earnings [data36]))/ 
Total Assets [data6] 
Newly Retained 
Earnings 
ΔRetained Earnings [data36] / Total Assets [data6] 
Net Debt Issued (ΔTotal Assets - e - ΔRE) / Total Assets [data6] 
Market-to-Book 
(Total Assets [data6] – Book Equity + Market Equity) / Total 
Assets [data6] 
Asset tangibility 
Net Plant, Property and Equipment [data8] / Total Assets 
[data6] 
Profitability 
Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation [data13] / 
Total Assets [data6] 
Size Log (Net Sales [data12]) 
Dividends over Book 
Equity 
Common Stock Dividends [data21] / Book Equity 
Dividends over Market 
Equity 
Common Stock Dividends [data21] / Market Equity 
Depreciation Expense 
to Assets 
Depreciation Expense [data14] / Total Assets [data6] 
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R&D to Assets Research and Development [data46] / Total Assets [data6] 
R&D Dummy 
RDD=1 if Research and Development [data46] is missing; else 
RDD=0 
Log of Assets Log (Total Assets [data6]) 
 
